Something other than human inquisitiveness seems to hold sway over this endeavour. The view of nature as an immense outdoors in vivo laboratory discloses nature in an outspokenly technical way. As long as we merely adopt this latent view, rather than questioning it, it will pervade scientific discourse up to the point of becoming self-evident and seemingly unquestionable, so that not only science but also philosophy of science will fall victim to its sway.
Researchers will be put to work in research laboratories to confirm its truth. It is only by questioning the grounding dominating terms, the philosophemes, via an oblique perspective, that we can distance ourselves from this obfuscating termino-logical ambiance, which blinds us to other possible answers concerning the question What is nature?
The focus on misconduct could reflect growing tensions between traditional research ethics focused on autonomous, responsible researchers, conducting researcher-driven experiments, publishing results as single authors or small teams and the emerging trend towards large-scale research consortia, which includes automation and multiple authorship, resulting in a marginalisation of the scientific individual Zwart Humans eventually become mere operators, highly dependent on their equipment.
In other words, for Habermas, the trend is toward the marginalisation and instrumentalisation of the subject, whose activities become automated and overregulated. But as individuals will never completely coincide with their pre-formatted roles, they will increasingly become a source of confusion and deceit, or even potential frauds.
Corpus (Perspectives in Continental Philosophy) [Jean-Luc Nancy, Richard A. Rand] on moifruchrealuc.tk *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. How have we. Perspectives in Continental Philosophy is devoted to the whole spectrum of . " Hoc est corpus meum" has shaped all our culture as well as our modernity.
Serres likewise argues that, in research fields such as molecular biology, researchers are decentred by automation and laboratory equipment, and outcompeted by computers and robotics. They may even become a superfluous burden, a source of error or misconduct. And this is already happening. Oblique explorations bring the broader landscape into view which gives rise to the debate currently in vogue, especially among research managers, university boards and funding agencies on research integrity and misconduct.
Although they often remain inarticulate, they provide pervasive guidance. This idea, although hardly ever articulated and discussed explicitly, pre-structures emerging life sciences discourse.
In principle these basic philosophemes and imperatives may be presented in a top-down, apodictic, authoritative, ex cathedra fashion. The discourse of the Master addresses a scholastic readership. The Master in the upper-left position of the agent is an acknowledged, allegedly infallible, authoritative voice, as we have seen.
Masters address disciples in the upper-right position, as recipients of the message and produce a particular type of discourse, immersed in contemplation, metaphysics and basic geometry. Plato and Aristotle may count as paradigmatic examples of Master-thinkers or gentlemen-philosophers. They develop a platonic view of nature. The Master the gentleman-philosopher is initially in control. Lacan points to the dialogue between Socrates and the slave Meno, where Socrates acts as a benevolent gentleman-teacher, granting the illiterate slave a crash course into Euclidean geometry, only to discover that the slave already knows his geometry, albeit in a practical, hands-on way.
But in the end, the practical knowledge of the servants will prove much more powerful and effective compared to the lofty contemplations of the Masters who, instead of really interacting with and transforming nature, rather develop a worldview, i. Eventually, the supremacy of the Master S 1 will by subverted by the practical know-how of the servant S 2 , so that in the end S 2 will come to occupy usurp the upper-left position as agent. Initially, the Servant acknowledges the supremacy of the Master. Such servants are put to work, in the interest of the Master.
Rather than aspiring to become Masters themselves, which would lead to competition and warfare, they accept a subordinate position of dependency. Inevitably, however, a dialectal dynamics unfolds, which eventually subverts the situation in the sense that the discourse of the Master becomes increasingly dependent on the work of the servants. But the emancipation of the servants does not stop there. Rather, instead of relying on the signifiers coined by the Master to understand nature, the servants will explore and interact with nature more directly.
Exegesis increasingly gives way to experimental work manipulating and quantifying nature.
vendukipula.cf Via skills and know-how, the servants assume mastery over the situation. They become scientists, scientific agents S 2 in the upper-left position , while the meta-physical pontifications of the Master becomes a superfluous burden, so that the power relationship becomes subverted, and a new type of discourse emerges, to which Lacan refers as the university discourse:. Now the Master no longer addresses the Servant explicitly. The former servants have emancipated themselves: they have become scientific experts, addressing nature on their own accord.
They focus their attention on a particular object, however, a particular problem or process, a particular molecule or model organism: a particular object of choice a. Although initially the scientists S 2 seem in control of the situation, eventually the unfathomable object may prove a demanding, addictive, toxic lure. Instead of the expert being in control manipulating the object it is the other way around: the object becomes the active force, drawing the researcher towards it. Rather than experiencing gratification and success, scientific subjects will often find themselves hopelessly chained to and drained by their inexorable object a.
This dialectical schema may also help to understand the changing relationships between philosophy and science. Philosophy no longer occupies the position of the Master, as it did during previous epochs, when metaphysics was still in vogue S 1 as agent. Scientists develop increasingly effective lab tools to generate robust knowledge and refurbish nature. The contemplating gentleman is dethroned, and metaphysics no longer provides apodictic guidance. Metaphysics is marginalised, becomes a research field in statu moriendi , and yet it is still there, occupying the position of the suppressed, latent, disavowed truth of scientific discourse S 1 below the bar.
Metaphysics has been replaced and subverted by insights produced by natural science. A field of knowledge which once aspired supremacy over other more practical and reality-oriented fields has now fallen silent. The era of metaphysics did not end with the rise of laboratory science, Hegel argues, but the focus of attention must now shift to the implicit metaphysics at work in scientific discourse S 1 , the basic premises, pushed beneath the bar, as the terminological unconscious of science. Philosophers may question and critically assess the latent but guiding philosophemes S 1 of science.
We simply cannot ignore this basic philosopheme of science. Science is adrift, moreover. Experimental researchers S 2 as agents upper-left position focus their attention on various kinds of objects as targets of their cupido sciendi , their will to know. Laboratory objects a particular type of microbe, virus or protein or a particular model organism function as the intractable entity object a in the upper-right position which drains their intellectual energy, time and resources, but continues to escape them, for instance because initial results cannot be replicated.
Corpus use and learning to translate. They did not believe that it is possible to formulate the rules determining the meaning of a word in such a way that it is possible to calculate exactly what this word means in a given context. Robert Fulghum. The new paradigm of social epistemology accepts that at the bottom of truth and factuality there is always interpretation: the negotiation of what has been said. The must develop methods that will tell them what makes a single occurrence unique. Houellebecq M.
In normal science, the laboratory expert S 2 as agent seems firmly in control, but in real laboratory life, scientists may fall victim to the situation, become trapped by the inexorable object a , on which a whole life-time may be wasted. What mode of discourse will philosophy generate, looking at and listening to science from an oblique perspective? Philosophy becomes research, but in its own oblique way. The focus is neither on the oeuvre of the Master as in author studies , nor on developing a specific type of expertise such as health law or bioethics, which concur, in terms of discursive structure, with university discourse , but rather on the ways in which life science research is enacted and life sciences discourse is framed.
Some instances of philosophical inquiry may reflect what Lacan refers to as university discourse, namely when philosophers aspire to develop specialized expert knowledge, as ethical experts for instance, applying basic sets of principles or argumentative skills to cases.
Such experts serve as ethical engineers. Mainstream applied bioethics reflects the university mode of discourse when ethical expertise basically consists in a particular kind of literacy and fluency concerning a particular ethical grammar, developed for analysing and addressing moral dilemmas in preformatted ways. This type of discourse figures prominently in societal debates on science and technology, where philosophers may become activists, challenging the voice of authority, the authoritative Other as the recipient of the message S 1 in the upper-right position :.
In his book Critique of Cynical Reason , Peter Sloterdijk endorses this type of discourse as a genuine philosophical position, by tracing its genealogy, which takes us back to the ancient Cynics: a boisterous tradition relying on provocative gestures and dramatic, ludicrous or scandalous interventions, a bold, impertinent, popular, gay, practical, provocative, theatrical and grotesque style of moral critique Zwart What is really driving their protest often directed at very specific targets , what kind of uneasiness or desire is at work beneath the bar, pointing beyond the issue at hand perhaps, towards a more basic discontent in science, or in civilisation even?
What do these activists really want? By asking such questions, philosophers have already entered a different type of discourse, namely the discourse of the analyst. This type of discourse builds on the tradition inaugurated by Socrates, and the oblique approach is quite compatible with his ethos, bent on transforming seemingly every-day settings lectures, discussions, readings, meetings, site-visits, etc.
Psychoanalysis is not a science, but a discursive practice prompting self-reflection. What is it that researchers find so fascinating about their object a? Why do they waste the most fruitful years of their life on this alluring entity, why do they consider it the panacea or missing link? Oblique philosophy basically entails embedded dialogue, however and philosophical interpretations and assessments are only valid and effective insofar as they provoke further deliberations and reflections on the part of the scientific subjects themselves i.
But in the current era, where philosophical reflection has become a collective and distributed endeavour, such a scenario has become less likely. This does not imply that philosophers should engage in the discourse of the analyst continuously. In the unfolding process they may switch to other types of discourse, opt for other discursive modes, temporarily acting as author studies expert, for instance or ethics expert, or social activist, but the discourse of the analyst, concurring with the oblique perspective, allows us to discern the strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and traps of these discursive options.
Rather than opting for expertise, activism or pontification, oblique philosophers point to discursive symptoms, ambiguities, blind spots and contradictions that reflect the philosophemes adrift. The starting point is that we no longer know what nature, life, truth, technology, etc. Such issues emerge in the context of a critical dialogue, a living oblique laboratory, a mutual learning exercise.
In order to detect and disclose the philosophemes S 1 , specific signifiers are singled out as especially relevant. The basic tendency in scientific research is towards anonymisation and normalisation of the scientific subject. Research has become large-scale teamwork conducted by consortia employing big machines and resulting in multiple author output, where hundreds of researchers may be listed as author, in alphabetic order. Authorship attribution is increasingly becoming a device for facilitating the production, storage, circulation and retrieval of texts preferably in electronic formats or for detecting and penalising misconduct.
Until recently, he argues, the scientist was a genius, a privileged individual expected to solve big riddles in a single, brilliant stroke.
In contemporary science, however, such forms of ego-centricity have clearly become untenable. What does it matter who is speaking? In this indifference towards individuality, Foucault argues, resides the fundamental ethos of contemporary scientific discourse. Scientific discourse is framed as an anonymous and interminable practice.
To some extent, this ethos has been there from the very beginning. Heraclitus already urged his audience not to pay attention to him as a person but rather, via him, to reason as such. In contemporary scientific discourse this imperative seems very much alive. While browsing through the scientific literature, we read discourse rather than authors.
To single out one particular author or even a small number of authors , in the context of Nobel Prize award procedures for instance, seems increasingly unfeasible and unfair Zwart Thus, the subject-pole of the knowledge dynamics is exposed to similar processes of purification and standardisation as the object-pole. The subject is effectively decentred, depersonalised and emptied of its ideological, subjective content, through training and socialisation, but also via automation and laboratory equipment. Yet, this can never be fully achieved, due to the recalcitrance of the research targets involved.
Individuals will eventually prove unable to completely live up to the methodological imperatives proclaimed by the demanding superego of Big Science S 1. They become introverts, stubbornly refusing to displace their intentionality to something else, or to be replaced themselves as this would imply separation from their laboratory object. The oblique perspective concurs with the discourse of the analyst, focussing on the object a in the upper-left position of agent as something which actively addresses and enforces itself upon the subject in the upper-left position as recipient.
And instead of opting for a top-down, metaphysical approach, philosophers read and reread the scientific files, the avalanche of papers produced by laboratories worldwide, with evenly-poised attention, from a tilted, oblique perspective, using revelatory signifiers complexomics , gnotobiology , etc.
It is via discourse that the scientific object comes into focus. Is the oblique perspective a retreat into purely linguistic terrain?